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I. INTRODUCTION
Former President Ronald Reagan enacted emergency economic
sanctions' against Libya on January 7, 19862 following terrorist attacks
on December 27, 1985, at the Vienna and Rome airports.3 Convincing
evidence indicated that the Libyan government supported the Abu
Nidal terrorist organization,4 which was responsible for the attacks.5
1. An economic sanction can be defined as a course of action undertaken by a
nation intended to prevent, regulate or otherwise hamper another state's economic ac-
tivity for the purpose of changing its policies. See Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls
as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of
Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, n.1 (1983) [hereinafter Moyer &
Mabry].
2. Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Reg. 875 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 173
(1986) (prohibits exports, imports, and other trade aspects with Libya). Reagan passed
additional sanctions the next day to freeze Libyan assets. Exec. Order No. 12,544 Fed.
Reg. 1,235 (1986) (freezes all Libyan assets held by American banks or persons), re-
printed in Documents Showing the Evolution of Sanctions Against Libya, 25 I.L.M.
173, 181 (1986) (hereinafter Evolution of Sanctions).
On June 23, 1986 the Department of the Treasury amended its regulations to
further restrict the shipment of goods to the Libyan petroleum and petrochemical in-
dustry. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LIBYAN SANC-
TIONS 12 (1987) (hereinafter GAO REPORT). The government further amended the
sanctions in June and July of 1986: 31 C.F.R § 550.560 (1989) (clarifying travel re-
strictions); 31 C.F.R. § 550.409.901 (1989) (tightening prohibitions on exports from
the U.S. to Libya through third countries); and 31 C.F.R. § 550.605 (1989) (order-to
those U.S. corporations with affiliates engaging in Libyan transactions to report to the
U.S. Department of Treasury). Bialos & Juster, The Libyan Sanctions: A Rational
Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 799, 801, n.5 (1986)
[hereinafter Bialos & Juster].
3. See President's News Conference of January 7, 1986, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 22 (January 13, 1986), reprinted in Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 2 at 175
(discussing Qadhafi's involvement in the airport bombings and other terrorist acts).
4. The Abu Nidal Group ranks among the most dangerous, organized, and well
financed Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 2
at 190. The group calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes such as
Jordan, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states. Id. Its ultimate goal is to use inter-Arab
and intra-Palestinian terrorism to obtain the liberation of Palestine. Id.
Moreover, the Abu Nidal Group has boldly attacked Jordanian, Egyptian, and
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Reagan designed the sanctions to achieve certain foreign policy goals'
which included changing Libya's practice of supporting and assisting
international terrorism.7 In 1989 President George Bush extended eco-
nomic sanctions against Libya.' This comment examines how effective
the United States' emergency unilateral economic sanctions9 have been
in altering Libya's state policies toward international terrorism.
Section II identifies the current framework of both nonemergency
and emergency economic sanctions. Identifying limited nonemergency
sanctions is necessary to fully understand the context under which
emergency sanctions were enacted. Nonemergency sanctions failed to
coerce Libya into changing its policy of supporting terrorism. As a re-
sult, former President Reagan declared a national emergency and en-
acted emergency sanctions to deal with the Libyan threat.
Section III provides the actual analysis for measuring effective-
ness. This section advances the argument that economic sanctions are
most effective in the short to medium term, but less effective in the
long run. As time progresses, the Libyan economy adapts to any ad-
verse impact suffered under the sanctions. Despite long term ineffec-
tiveness, economic sanctions play an important policy role in the U.S.
government's ongoing efforts to curb international terrorism. These
sanctions send a stern message to Libya that the United States will no
United Kingdom interests. Id. Those countries have lost hundreds of lives to Abu Nidal
hijacking and terrorism. Id.
5. Id.
6. Foreign policy goals are changes sought by the sender state (the state imposing
the sanctions) in the political behavior of the target state (the state receiving the sanc-
tions). G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY 2 (1985) [hereinafter G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT].
7. Scholars and politicians have encountered difficulty stating a working definition
of "international terrorism". The United States Code defines international terrorism as
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine agents . .. involving citizens or the territory of
more than [one] country." 22 U.S.C. § 2656(F)(d)(1)(2) (1988). See also S. KADISH,
IV ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1529-1536 (1983) (generally discussing
terrorism and international terrorism from a historical, analytical, and legal
perspective).
8. On January 19, 1989 President George Bush publicly stated that he would con-
tinue the economic sanctions that his predecessor, former President Ronald Reagan,
implemented. Since President Bush's statement, the original 1986 economic sanctions
against Libya remain in effect. See U.S. DEP'T STATE BUREAU PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BACK-
GROUND NOTES: LIBYA 7 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES].
9. The term "unilateral economic sanctions" refers to sanctions applied by a single
nation. Economic sanctions applied by two nations working together are referred to as
"bilateral economic sanctions". The term "multilateral economic sanctions" refers to
sanctions applied by more than two nations.
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longer tolerate state sponsored terrorist acts. Economic sanctions are
often a more pragmatic alternative to using military force because mili-
tary action may compromise the United States' position in the interna-
tional community. However, when Libyan supported terrorist acts are
so heinous as to deserve stronger retaliation, military action serves as a
viable option.1"
II. THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST
LIBYA
A. The Purpose of Sanctions
The Libyan economic sanctions are aimed at achieving three pol-
icy goals. First, the United States desires to coerce Libya into changing
its terrorist policies or radical government. 1 The United States has
viewed the policies of Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi
with close scrutiny since he came to power in 1969.12 Since his rise to
10. When United States intelligence identified Libya's involvement in a Berlin dis-
cotheque terrorist bombing that killed an American serviceman, the United States re-
sponded by launching an aerial bombing attack against targets near Tripoli and Ben-
ghazi, Libya in April 1986. Greenwood, International Law and the United States' Air
Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA L. REV. 933, 934 (1987).
Former President Reagan attempted to legally justify the bombing on two ratio-
nales. First, as a valid use of self-defense against anticipated Libyan attacks. See gen-
erally Id. at 937-948. Second, to "preempt" Qadhafi from supporting future terrorist
acts. L. HENKIN, S. HOFFMAN, J. KIRKPATRICK, A. GERSON, W. ROGERS, & D.
SCHEFFER, RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 46
(1989) [hereinafter L. HENKIN].
The United Nations Charter regulates the amount of force that a member nation
can apply against another state: "All members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). The U.N. charter makes an explicit excep-
tion to article 2(4): "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Reagan also asserted that
the bombing did not exceed the right to self-defense articulated in article 51. Mr. Hen-
kin disagrees. His interpretation of Article 51 does not recognize a right to use force to
retaliate for past terrorist attacks. Instead, the right to self-defense only extends to
concurrent attacks. L. HENKIN, supra note 12, at 62.
11. See Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1170 (1987) [hereinafter Carter].
12. On September 1, 1969 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) over-
threw Libyan King Idris. The new regime converted the country from its former mon-
archy rule, to the present Libyan Arab Republic. Colonel Qadhafi and the RCC gov-
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power, Colonel Qadhafi has focused Libya's foreign policy agenda on
international terrorism13 and subversion against moderate Arab and
African governments. His 1980 attempt to overthrow the government
of Hissen Habre in Chad resulted in international involvement and
many casualties, before foreign leaders eventually divided Chad. 14
The second goal underlying the economic sanctions against Libya
focuses on punishing that country for its subversive terrorist policies. 15
The punishment aspect of economic sanctions remains the most funda-
mental rationale. Economic sanctions are imposed to punish a country
for its policies or actions when direct military response may not be po-
erned Libya exclusively until 1977. On March 3, 1977 Qadhafi convened a General
People's Congress (GPC) as a means of facilitating citizen participation in the govern-
ment. After this event, Qadhafi remained the de facto chief of state and Secretary
General of the GPC until 1980. Despite the fact that he holds no official office, Colonel
Qadhafi currently dictates Libya's foreign policy through appeals to the masses, secur-
ity forces, and revolutionary committees. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 3-4.
13. Libya finances, trains, and even harbors international groups that share
Qadhafi's revolutionary and anti-Western views. The Japanese Red Army, and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command have been identified
as receiving Libyan assistance. Id. at 6. Qadhafi finances guerrilla movements, confer-
ences for radicals, and terrorists in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala in order to subvert Latin American Countries and foster an anti-U.S.
climate. DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE, LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMI-
SPHERE, 8 (August 1986). Qadhafi also provided financial assistance and military train-
ing to the former Sandanista government in Nicaragua. Id. at 1.
Six countries in the Western Hemisphere have Libyan "Peoples' Bureaus" (em-
bassies): Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and Suriname. Id. at 5. Pan-
ama and Suriname do not have embassies in Libya for economic reasons.
Qadhafi likewise extends his political reach by organizing Islamic groups in Barba-
dos, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, and Nicaragua. These groups could very well be
establishing intelligence groups under the pretense of "religious groups" Id. The Lib-
yan also provide funding to Caribbean radicals in Antigua, Dominica, French Guiana,
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, and St. Lucia.
Most recently, U.S. and foreign intelligence has discovered that Libyan factories
are now producing mustard gas which can be used in chemical warfare. Despite the
fact that Libya lacks long range missiles to deploy the mustard gas, this event has
unquestionably alarmed certain countries. A group attempted to sabotage the plant by
setting it on fire. Newsweek, March 19, 1990, at 33, col. 1.
14. Qadhafi withdrew most of his troops from Chad in 1981 after receiving in-
tense international diplomatic pressure. The United States and France supported
Habre. In 1983 3,000 French troops, along with the Chadian government forced
Qadhafi to release some of his newly acquired Chadian territory. Nevertheless, Libya
still occupies most of the Aozou strip separating the two countries.
BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 6.
15. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1170.
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litically feasible."6 In any event, the United States government makes it
clear that only so many terrorist acts will be tolerated before the U.S.
retaliates with military force.17
The third goal of imposing economic sanctions against Libya cen-
ters on symbolically demonstrating U.S. opposition towards Libyan pol-
icies.'" This rationale reflects not only an attempt to inform Libya that
the United States is cognizant of its policies, but also to assure other
countries and United States citizens that the U.S. government is "do-
ing something" about Libyan sponsored terrorism. The Reagan admin-
istration hoped that U.S. economic action against Libya would en-
courage other countries to impose similar economic controls against
Libya.
The preceding goals underlying the imposition of economic sanc-
tions against Libya are consistent with U.S. foreign policy dealings
with other countries. Through the Department of the Treasury (herein-
after "Treasury") the government imposes similar sanctions against
Iran,' 9 Nicaragua, 20 and South Africa.2
B. Scope of Nonemergency Sanctions
United States economic sanctions are broadly categorized as limits
on: (1) United States government programs; (2) exports; (3) imports;
(4) private financial transactions; and (5) international financial insti-
tutions.22 United States laws grant the President wide latitude to im-
pose economic sanctions for foreign policy reasons during. nonemer-
gency and emergency situations. Nonemergency controls provide the
fundamental framework for economics.
16. See generally, Comment, Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative to
Military Coercion?, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289 (1980) (hereinafter Economic Sanc-
tions) (discusses the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations
on Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa).
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1170.
19. 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1989) (Iranian transactions regulations enacted October
1987 have the effect of banning almost all imports from that country. Regulations were
passed because of that country's extremist anti-western foreign policies).
20. 31 C.F.R. § 540 et. seq. (1989) (Nicaraguan trade control regulations).
21. 31 C.F.R. § 545 et. seq. (1989) (South African transactions regulations en-
acted to show disagreement with that country's policy of Apartheid rule, a system in
which the white minority rules the African majority through a racist caste system).
22. Carter, supra note 11, at 1164.
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1. Nonemergency Laws
(a) Export Controls
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA)23 provides an ef-
fective means of imposing economic sanctions on Libya through non-
emergency laws. Substantive EAA provisions are divided into national
security and foreign policy classifications.24 Both sections authorize the
President to regulate the exports of goods, technology, and other infor-
mation.15 All exports from the United States must have a general li-
cense. Sanctions can be more effectively imposed by making export li-
censing more difficult to obtain. Thus, certain items subject to stricter
export controls for national security or foreign policy reasons require a
validated license.2 6
Although the EAA lapsed in 1983, Congress enacted the Export
Administration Amendments Act of 1985, (1985 EAAA) which effec-
tively renewed major provisions of the 1979 EAA.27 The Congressional
policy of using export controls to prevent countries from supplying aid
or giving sanctuary to international terrorists remains virtually un-
changed.28 However, the 1985 EAA imposed additional time limits on
agricultural embargoes, 29 restrictions on the President's power to im-
23. 50 U.S.C. app. § § 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
24. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in
the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN L. REv. 739, 859 (1981) (hereinafter Abbott).
25. Id.
26. E.g. 15 C.F.R. § 776.16 (1989) (Pursuant to § 6 of the EAA a validated
export license is required for foreign policy purposes to export: (a) Military vehicles
and certain commodities used to manufacture military equipment identified on the
commodity Control List under CCL listings 2018A, 11 18A, 2406A, and 2603A, to any
destination except Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, and Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Therefore, a
valid export license is required to export the above mentioned articles to Libya.)
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § § 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 99-64, § 102, 99 Stat. 120 (1985)).
28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. V 1987) declares that:
[iut is the policy of the United States to use export controls to encourage
other countries to take immediate steps to prevent the use of their territories
or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to those persons involved in
directing, supporting, or participating in directing, supporting, or participat-
ing in acts of international terrorism. To achieve this objective, the President
shall make reasonable and prompt efforts to secure the removal or reduction
of such assistance to international terrorists through international cooperation
and agreement before imposing export controls.
29. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g)(3)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1987).
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pose foreign policy controls, 0 and created a new provision for preserv-
ing existing contracts. 1
The President may also exercise control over exports through the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA). 32 Congress empowers the President
to control defense articles in order to ensure United States and world
security.33Persons violating the requisite licensing requirements are
subject to criminal penalties.34 In 1978 former President Carter used
the AECA to impose the first economic sanctions against Libya. The
ban prohibited all sales of military equipment to Libya. 36
Both the 1985 EAAA and the AECA effectively regulate United
States exports to Libya. In U.S. v. Malsom,36 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendants' convictions for attempting
to export, exporting, and conspiring to export, implements of war and
other controlled commodities from the United States to Libya without
proper export licenses.3 7 The appellate court rejected defendants' argu-
30. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (the President may impose or
expand export controls only after consulting with the Congress, including the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate).
31. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (the President may not prohibit
export or reexport of goods, technology or other information in performance of a con-
tract executed prior to the date the President consults with Congress pursuant to 50
U.S.C. app. § 2405(0 (Supp. V 1987)).
32. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 et. seq. (1988) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-329,
90 Stat. 729 (1976)).
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1988) states that:
[i]n furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the
United States, the President is authorized to control the import and export of
defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to
persons of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles
and services. The President is authorized to designate those items which shall
be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this
section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such arti-
cles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the Unites States
Munitions List.
The munitions lists enumerates such articles as aircraft, amphibious vehicles, fire-
arms, and military explosives. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 et. seq. (1989).
34. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988) (any persons violating the provisions set forth
in § 2778 are subject to a fine of no more than $100,000 and imprisonment for no more
than two years).
35. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 6, at 620.
36. 779 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1985).
37. Id. at 1230. Donald Malsom served as the general manager of co-defendant
Tencom Corporation, a corporation engaged in supplying commercial and aviation
equipment and procuring military equipment. In 1980 the defendant's corporation
faced immediate bankruptcy. The company's president, Nedim Sulyak, obtained a con-
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ments that they lacked criminal intent to violate export laws, and that
the lower court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized from
Tencom's headquarters.3 8 The appellate court also found no lower court
error in its decision not to order a mistrial due to widespread media
coverage of Libyan military activities. 39 The prosecution presented suf-
ficient evidence to refute each appellate argument.
Recently, in U.S. v. Elkins,"0 the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit upheld the defendant's lower court conviction for violating
the EAA, AECA, and United States conspiracy laws."1 The defend-
ant's prosecution in Elkins stemmed from an investigation into the
shipment of two Lockheed L-100-30 aircraft to Libya during 1985.42
Both prosecutions in Malsom and Elkins illustrate how nonemergency
export controls play an important role in combating Libyan sponsored
terrorism. By imposing stringent licensing requirements the 1985
EAAA and AECA prevent United States citizens from providing Libya
with military equipment that could be used to commit international
acts of terrorism. Elkins clearly stated that export licenses for shipping
planes to Libya would surely be denied due to the statutory export
prohibitions. 4'3 The 1985 EAAA also requires that applications for ex-
port licenses to countries supporting terrorism be reported to various
Congressional and Senate Committees."
tract for $20 million to sell aircraft parts to Libya for use on C-130 Hercules cargo
transport planes and Chinook CH-47 Libyan helicopters. Tencom never applied for the
requisite State or Commerce Department license. Id.
Tencom successfully shipped parts to West Germany, with an ultimate destination
of Libya or Venice, Italy. Libya serviced its C-130 in Venice at a plant called Aer-
onavali. In February and August of 1981, Tencom also shipped C-130 engines and
airplane propellers through West Germany to Libya. All of the above transactions vio-
late export restriction of controlled military parts enacted during 1978. Id. at 1231-
1232.
38. See id. at 1231
39. Malsom, 779 F.2d at 1233.
40. 885 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1989).
41. See id. at 781, n.4. A lower court jury found the defendant guilty of violating:
(1) the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2410(a); (2) the Arms Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) and 2778(c), 22 C.F.R. § 121 et. seq.; (3) 18 U.S.C. §
1001; and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Id.
42. Id. at 779.
43. Id.
44. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j)(1) (Supp. V 1987) provides that:
[t]he Secretary and the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on foreign Relations of the
Senate at least 30 days before any license is approved for the export of goods
or technology valued at more than $1,000,000 to any country concerning
1990]
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(b) Import Controls
Executive authority to impose import controls for national security
reasons comes primarily from Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962.45 On March 10, 1982, the United States imposed broader eco-
nomic restrictions on Libya by placing an oil embargo on Libyan crude
oil imports.46 The Reagan administration hoped the embargo would cut
off funds available for sponsoring terrorist activities.47 The oil embargo
resulted in a significant decline in United States-Libyan relations.
(c) Response to Libyan Involvement in Terrorist Acts
During the early 1980's the Reagan administration exhibited in-
creasing intolerance towards Libya's involvement in international acts
of terrorism. Former President Reagan responded directly to specific
terrorist acts by passing certain nonemergency sanctions. In August of
1981, two Libyan SU-22 jets attacked two United States F-14 jets
while the U.S. planes flew maneuvers over the Gulf of Sidra.4 Two
months after this incident, on October 28, 1981, the Reagan adminis-
tration imposed controls on exports of small aircraft, helicopters, and
aircraft parts to Libya.49 The executive branch designed the ban to
thwart Libya's ability to support military acts in neighboring
countries.5"
In November 1981, officials reported the Libyan Government's in-
volvement in a plot to assassinate the United States ambassador to It-
aly.51 Soon after officials revealed the assassination plot, terrorists
made an actual assassination attempt on the United States Charge
which the Secretary of State has made the following determinations:
(A) Such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of interna-
tional terrorism.
(B) Such exports would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or would
enhance the ability of such country to support acts of terrorism.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76
Stat. 872, 877).
46. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 805, n.20, citing Proclamation No. 4907, 47
Fed. Reg. 10,507 (1982), renewed by Proclamation No. 5141, 48 Fed. Reg 56,929
(1983).
47. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 6, at 621.
48. M. SICKER, THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE: THE ADVENTURIST POLITICS
OF MUAMMAR QADDAFI 116 (1987) [HEREINAFTER M. SICKER].
49. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 6, at 620.
50. Id.
51. M. SICKER, supra note 48, at 117.
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d'Affaires in Paris. 2 Then, on December 7, 1981, former President
Ronald Reagan asserted that Colonel Qadhafi had sent assassination
teams to the United States to murder him, former Vice President Bush,
and former Secretaries Haig and Weinberger 3 . The executive branch
responded to Libyan aggression by invalidating all American passports
used for travel to Libya as a safety precaution. 4 Even today, no United
States citizen may travel to Libya without a special validation on their
passport."'
The Reagan administration also restricted exports of sophisticated
oil and gas equipment, and technology destined for Libyan use.56 Ter-
rorist bombings at airports in Rome, Italy, and Vienna, Austria drew
international outrage. In the wake of these incidents, the United States
no longer idly accepted Libya's policy of supporting international ter-
rorism. Government evidence indicated that Libya provided financial
support and sanctuary to terrorists involved in the three incidents.
5 7
C. Scope of 1986 Emergency Sanctions
1. Emergency Laws
On January 7, 1986 former President Reagan responded to
Libya's involvement in airport bombings in Rome, Italy, and Vienna58
by ordering widespread emergency economic sanctions against Libya.5 9
52. Id.
53. See Id.
54. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 805, n.18, citing 46 Fed. Reg. 60,712
(1981). The passport regulations states that:
[t]his action is required.by the unsettled relations between the United States
and the government of Libya, and the increased threat of hostile acts against
Americans. Travel to or residence in Libya by American citizens is hazard-
ous, because of the continued anti-American stance and hostile actions of the
Libyan Government. The Government of Libya has repeatedly demonstrated
a willingness to direct hostile acts against the United States Government, is
not in a position to provide diplomatic protection or consular assistance to
Americans in Libya. Under the circumstances, there is an imminent danger to
the physical safety of Americans traveling to or present in Libya.
Id.
55. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.73(a)(3) (1989) (requiring a specifically validated pass-
port for travel to a country in which there is imminent danger to the health or safety of
U.S. citizens).
56. Expansion of Foreign Policy Export Controls Concerning Libya, 47 Fed. Reg.
11,247 (1982) (now codified in pertinent part at 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
57. See supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. See Supra note 2.
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Reagan passed additional sanctions to freeze Libyan assets the follow-
ing day.:0 The President derives statutory power to enact Libyan sanc-
tions from the Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)," the Na-
tional Emergency Act (NEA),6 2 and the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985.63 Statutory language mandates
that the IEEPA only be invoked to impose economic sanctions when
"any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States" exists."' Upon a deter-
mination that such a condition exists, the President must then declare a
national emergency pursuant to the NEA.15 The IEEPA simultane-
ously vests the President with power to enact sweeping import, export,
and financial controls through licenses bans upon declaring the national
emergency. 66
Some controversy exists over Reagan's decision to utilize the
IEEPA to invoke economic sanctions against Libya. Libya's continued
involvement with international terrorism may not have constituted an
"unusual extraordinary threat" for IEEPA purposes.6 7 Reagan justified
declaring a national emergency by citing Libya's increased involvement
in terrorist activities, and the United States' failure to change these
practices using current measures.6 " Few would deny that the minimal,
nonemergency economic controls had little effect on altering Libya's
policy of supporting international terrorism. However, Reagan's deci-
60. Id.
61. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (specifically, former
President Reagan invoked his power under 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982)).
62. 50 U.S.C. § 1601-1651 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 94-412 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)).
63. See 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-8(a) (1988) (grants the President the power to pro-
hibit articles grown, produced, extracted, or manufactured in Libya from being im-
ported into the United States). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2344aa-8(b) (1988) (grants the
President the power to prohibit U.S. goods or technology from being exported to
Libya).
64. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (1982 & V Supp. 1987).
65. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (the section authorizes the
president to declare a national emergency when he feels such a situation exists, or when
faced with any special or extraordinary occurrence).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (enumerating the President's au-
thority pursuant to the IEEPA).
67. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 809.
68. President's Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
(January 7, 1986), reprinted in Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 2, at 174-175 (for-
mer President Reagan described his statutory power and reasoning for invoking the
emergency sanctions).
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sion to invoke the IEEPA still remains questionable. The airport bomb-
ings took place in countries far away from United States soil, and
therefore did not directly threaten national security. A national emer-
gency could be rationalized by arguing that since Americans travel
abroad, random bombings at airports generally threaten the safety of
American tourists.
(a) General Components of the Sanctions
Executive orders Numbers 12,543 and 12,544 are implemented by
the Office of Foreign Assets Controls in the Treasury, through the Lib-
yan Sanctions Regulations." Since the Department of Commerce
(hereinafter "Commerce") shares export control power with the Trea-
sury, Commerce enacted regulations subjugating its export licenses to
the emergency export controls.70 The broad framework of the economic
sanctions suggests that the Reagan administration sought to alter Lib-
yan foreign policy by eliminating all United States trade contributions
that could be used to either finance acts of terrorism, or provide the
terrorists with actual weaponry. Libyan emergency sanctions loosely re-
flect the export, import and private financial transaction categories of
economic sanctions.71 The Treasury chose not to adopt sanctions limit-
ing U.S. government program interaction with Libya. Poor United
States-Libyan relations previously resulted in any such programs being
canceled.72 Similarly, the sanctions impose no limits on international
financial institutions. Institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB)73 exist
69. 31 C.F.R. § 550 et. seq. (1989) (originally enacted as 51 Fed. Reg. 1354,
1358 (1986)).
70. See 15 C.F.R. § 790.7(a) (1989) (revoking all existing export licenses conflict-
ing with 31 C.F.R. 550 et. seq., on February 1, 1986 at 12:00a.m. Eastern Standard
Time).
71. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
72. Typical government programs are either categorized as providing foreign as-
sistance or landing rights. Carter, supra note 11, at 1183. Primary programs include:
"bilateral foreign assistance, low-interest credit, loan guaranties, special insurance pro-
grams, fishing rights, port access, aircraft landing rights, and passports." Id. The
United States trade relationship with Libya previously involved mainly oil imports from
that country most of the listed programs are inapplicable.
United States passports for travel to Libya are only permitted with a special vali-
dation from the Passport Office. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.73 (a)(3) (1989) (invalidating a
passport to a country or area in which there is imminent danger to the public health or
physical safety of United States travelers). Such passports are usually denied as a mat-
ter of. general policy.
73. MDB's consist of the World Bank Group (the International Bank for Recon-
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outside the United States' legislative jurisdiction. 74
The Libyan economic sanctions only apply to a "United States
person",71 and to exports and imports directly controlled by the United
States. A "United States Citizen" refers to any United States citizen,
permanent resident alien, juridical person,76 or any person within U.S.
borders." The jurisdictional reach of the sanctions only extends to
United States citizens and U.S. controlled goods because the Reagan
administration sought to avoid any extraterritorial jurisdiction7 1
problems. Such problems arise when other nations refuse to cooperate
with the United States' extraterritorial attempts at extending U.S.
sanctions for fear that their own foreign or economic policies will be
damaged.79
Although the U.S. cannot compel foreign governments to honor
U.S. emergency sanctions, it can compel all U.S. citizens to comply
with relevant provisions. Provisions against evading the scope of emer-
gency sanctions ensure that creative individuals do not undertake com-
plex transactions to avoid the reach of Libyan economic sanctions. The
evasion section prohibits transactions designed to evade or avoid any of
the established prohibitions.8 " For example, United States parent com-
panies cannot transfer Libyan contracts to foreign subsidiaries to evade
the sanctions."'
struction and Development, the International Development Association, and the Inter-
national Finance Corporation. Carter, supra note 8, at 1218, n.229), the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank, the Asian Development Band, and the African Development
Bank. Id.
74. The United States has little policy influence over these banks since there is no
common governing. For example, the IMF's primary concern is promoting interna-
tional monetary cooperation and stability in foreign exchange. To fulfill this purpose it
necessarily remains apolitical to world events.
75. See 31 C.F.R. § § 550.201 - 550.209 (1989).
76. The term "juridical person" is actually a misnomer. A "juridical person" does
not mean person within the traditional context of the word. Instead it refers to a corpo--
ration, partnership, or sole proprietorship organized under United States Law. GAO
REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
77. 31 C.F.R. § 550.308 (1989).
78. Juridical power which extends beyond the physical limits of a particular state
or country. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (5th ed. 1979).
79. See Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of
United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 324 (1981).
80. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.208 (prohibits "[a]ny transaction for the purpose of, or
which has the effect of, evading or avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth ....
81. GAO REPORT supra note 2, at 9.
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2. Prohibiting U.S. Contract Performance
A provision banning United States performance of United States-
Libyan contracts remains the most controversial emergency economic
sanction. The Treasury stated that "except as authorized, no U.S. per-
son may perform any contract in support of an industrial or other com-
mercial or governmental project in Libya."82 A literal reading of this
provision suggests that United States persons are prohibited from en-
tering into new contracts, and performing existing contracts with the
Libyan government.83 The U.S. government supports this interpreta-
tion. Workers under contract with Libyan oil companies immediately
felt the impact of contract prohibitions when their employment con-
tracts became void.
In Chang v. U.S.,84 petroleum engineers under contract with Lib-
yan oil companies brought an action against the United States alleging
that the termination of their contracts and loss of wages resulted in a
Fifth Amendment taking.85 The Federal Circuit upheld the contract
ban provision as constitutional. In reaching its decision, the court re-
fused to raise the government's interference to the level of a Fifth
Amendment taking.86 The court reasoned that economic sanctions did
not totally prohibit the plaintiffs from marketing their services; the
workers could seek employment elsewhere.87 The court further claimed
that legitimate state interests of national security far outweighed any
loss in wages suffered by the individual workers.8 8 Most importantly,
the court noted that any United States person who enters into a con-
tract with a foreign nation to work in that nation, automatically be-
comes aware that his employment is contingent on good relations be-
tween the two countries.s9
(a) Exceptions to the Prohibition of Contract Performance
The contract ban provisions lack any extraterritorial reach.9"
82. 31 C.F.R. § 550.205 (1989).
83. In actuality, all existing contracts are retroactively banned. Bialos & Juster,
supra note 2, at 813.
84. 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
85. Chang, 859 F.2d at 894. The relevant constitutional language provides that:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
86. Id. at 893.
87. Id. at 896.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying note 74 (the Libyan economic sanctions only
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Therefore, any person who is nor a "United States citizen", "perma-
nent resident alien", "juridical person organized under the laws of the
United States", or "person in the United States" can freely perform
contracts with the Libyan government. United States oil corporations
and the Libyan government engaged in joint oil venture agreements9
on Libyan soil when the sanctions were first imposed in 1986.92 The
Treasury granted five major oil companies93 a limited hardship excep-
tion to the 1986 economic sanctions. If the Treasury compelled the oil
companies to abandon their contracts, Qadhafi could have kept the lost
profits.
The administration recognized Qadhafi's possible windfall and en-
acted limited exceptions for the U.S. oil company's benefit. First, the
Treasury announced that United States firms must remove their prop-
erty or sell it to Libya, Libyan nationals, or other persons who would
not use the property in Libya.94 Second, the Treasury granted the oil
companies a limited license to allow them time to remove their materi-
als from Libya. 95 The licenses authorized the companies to: (1) "con-
tinue ownership of their property;" (2) "sell Libyan crude oil at Libyan
ports but not ship or distribute the oil"; (3) "participate in manage-
ment decisions"; and (4) "continue paying their share of operating
expenses." 96
apply to "United States" persons).
91. The joint venture can be classified as either concession agreements or explora-
tion and producing agreements. Concession agreements with the National Oil Corpora-
tion required the United States Oil Companies to provide 49 percent of the operating
expenses, taxes, rents and royalties in exchange for 49 percent of the oil produced and
paid. The National Oil Corporation paid 51 percent of the expenses in exchange for 51
percent of the profits. Under exploration and production sharing agreements a smaller
percentage of the oil produced was received in exchange of rents, royalties, and taxes.
Operating expenses remained the same 49 to 51 percent ratio. GAO REPORT, supra
note 2, at 16.
92. United States oil companies held exclusive rights to Libyan oil prior to 1973.
In exchange the companies paid the Libyan government rent, royalties, and taxes. Dur-
ing 1973 the United States firms were required to sell Libya a 51 percent equity inter-
est. The Libyan Oil Corporation supplied cash, and managed the operations. Libyan
and Western European workers from countries such as Italy replaced United States oil
field workers. In 1986 United States oil companies provided financing engineering and
technology to the joint ventures. Id. at 15.
93. The five oil corporations included: Amerada Hess Corp.; Conoco, Inc.; Mara-
thon Oil Co.; Occidental Petroleum Corp.; and W.R. Grace & Co. Bialos & Juster,
supra note 2, at 824, n.78.
94. Id. at 824, citing DEP'T OF STATE ANNOUNCEMENT: LIBYAN SANCTIONS (Feb-
ruary 7, 1986).
95. Id.
96. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
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On June 30, 1986, the Treasury revoked the temporary licenses.
The oil companies entered into a standstill agreement with the Na-
tional Oil Company and the government of Libya. The agreement pro-
vided for continued ownership rights for 3 years. The American compa-
nies could not receive any profits from newly produced oil, but they
also incurred no obligation to pay expenses.97 The rationale behind this
limited exception proved questionable. At face value, limited exceptions
seem equitable to corporations who-have vested profits flowing from
Libyan oil productions. Unfortunately, limited exceptions to the con-
tract ban may have cushioned the sanctions effect on Libya. In any
event, the standstill agreement ensures that United States oil compa-
nies will not totally loose their investments, thus creating an equitable
resolution to the issue of who bears the loss.
3. Prohibiting Exports of Goods, Technology or Services
If applied properly, export controls may influence a country into
changing its policies. The target country will succumb to the loss of
trade from the sender, and adapt its policies in order to receive the
needed goods or services. Ideally, export controls have the potential to
be the most effective weapon in the arsenal of economic sanctions.98
Export controls are divided into three classes of exports: (1) direct
exports to Libya; (2) exports to third countries for possible reexport to
Libya; and (3) reexport of United States' goods to Libya from third
countries.9 9 All three classes of exports are subject to licensing require-
ments analogous to EAA requirements. Like the EAA requirements,
the Libyan sanctions' export controls mandate that most goods and
technology be subject to a general license. 100 Similarly, certain classes
97. Id.
98. Indeed, the United States often applies export controls against a target coun-
try expecting positive results. These expectations accompanied the U.S. employed ex-
port controls against Iran, and the U.S. grain embargo applied against the Soviet
Union when the country invaded Afghanistan. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 1, at 143.
The Iranian export controls on machinery proved effective because Iran depended on
the parts for the military and industry.
The Soviet grain embargo did not prove as effective, since the Soviet Union ob-
tained grain from alternate sources. While drafting export controls, the administration
remained cognizant to the fact that Libya did not totally depend on United States-
source products and could possibly endure economic sanctions. GAO REPORT supra
note 2, at 8. The Executive Branch no doubt realized that results similar to the Soviet
grain embargo would probably follow.
99. Id. at 11-12.
100. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.801(a) (1989).
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of goods require a "specific" license. 01 This type of license is the coun-
terpart of the EAA's "validated" license.
(a) Direct Exports
Direct export controls are the strictest of the three controls. Goods,
services, and technology directly exported to Libya from the United
States must have "specific license[s]". °2 Three exceptions to the spe-
cific license requirement exist. Goods, services, and technology in
transit before the effective date of January 9, 1986 are not restricted. 0 3
This exception appears logical since any goods, services-and technology
shipped prior to the effective date are legal.
The Treasury also exempts "publications and donated articles in-
tended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, medicine and
medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes." 0 4 These ex-
ceptions are made purely for altruistic reasons. The Reagan adminis-
tration invoked the Libyan sanctions to prevent Qadhafi from obtaining
materials that could be used for terrorist activities. No intention existed
for prohibiting medicine or food for the needy.1 0 5 The Treasury makes
a third exception for exports authorized by the Department of Com-
merce. 0 Commerce allows such exports because the items do not di-
rectly enhance Libya's ability to support international terrorism.
101. See 31 C.F.R. 550.801(b)(1)(2)(3) (1989) (detailing specific licenses re-
quirements, application procedures, and information to be supplied on the application).
102. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
103. 31 C.F.R. § 550.404(b) (1989).
104. 31 C.F.R. § 550.202 (1989).
105. This viewpoint is consistent with Reagan's remarks during a press conference
held the day following the United States' bombing of selected Libyan targets. Ronald
Reagan indicated that the United States had no quarrel with innocent Libyan people.
Qadhafi and the terrorists are the United States' enemy. See ABC News Great T.V.
News Stories, Mu'ammar Qadhafi: Libya's Radical Ruler, (ABC Video/MPI Home
Video 1989) [hereinafter ABC Video].
106. 31 C.F.R. § 550.504 (1989). Commerce authorizes exports pursuant to the
following regulations:
(a) 15 C.F.R. § 371.6, General license baggage: accompanied and unaccompanied
baggage;
(b) 15 C.F.R. § 371.13, General license GUS: shipments to personnel and agencies
of the U.S. Government;
(c) 15 C.F.R. § 371.18, General license GIFT: shipments of gift parcels.
(d) 15 C.F.R. § 379.3, General license GTDA: technical data available to all
destinations.
Id.
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(b) Export of U.S. Goods to Third Countries for Possible Reexport
to Libya
A specific license must be obtained in order to export goods, ser-
vices, and technology to a third country for possible reexport to
Libya.1"7 Treasury requires a specific license in light of the possibility
that the items may eventually reach Libya. The specific license require-
ment allows the Treasury to monitor transactions more closely. Exports
are permitted when: (i) "[t]he goods will be substantially transformed
or incorporated into manufactured products before export to Libya;"',,
(ii) "[tihe goods will come to rest in a third country for purposes other
than reexport to Libya;' ' 0 9 and (iii) "[tihe technology will come to rest
in a third country for purposes other than reexport to Libya."
110
On June 23, 1986, the Treasury amended its regulations to further
prohibit exports. Exports are prohibited even if substantially altered,
when the exporter knows the materials will be used in Libya in the
petroleum or petrochemical industry."' Exports are also prohibited if
the exporter knows the goods are scheduled for shipment to Libya with-
out coming to rest in a third country" 2 or the exported technology shall
be transformed into products to be used in the petroleum industry."'
(c) Reexport of U.S. Goods to Libya from Third Countries
Reexport of U.S. goods to Libya from third countries differs from
exports of U.S. goods to third countries for possible reexport to Libya
in that the former involves the movement of goods from one foreign
destination to another." 4 Reexported goods of United States origin
come within the sole authority of the Commerce Department. Some of
these reexport controls existed for foreign policy or national security
reasons before the emergency economic sanctions took effect."' The
107. GAo REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
108. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(d)(1) (1989).
109. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(d)(2) (1989).
110. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(d)(3) (1989).
111. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(a)(2) (1989).
112. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(a)(1) (1989).
113. 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(a)(3) (1989).
114. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1989) (the term "reexport" includes: "reexport, tran-
shipment, or diversion of commodities or technical data from one foreign destination to
another").
115. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. Reexports are included in the "Emer-
gency Sanctions" section of this comment because the application of the sanction is
similar to the 1986 emergency sanctions.
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1986 sanctions do not undercut Commerce's authority over reexport
regulations.116
Commerce maintains a policy of generally denying reexport to
four groups of technology: (1) Commodities controlled for national se-
curity purposes and related technical data and oil and gas equipment
and related technical data not readily available outside the United
States;' 17 (2) goods and technology headed for the Ras Lanuf pe-
trochemical processing complex;118 (3) off-highway wheel tractors with
carriage capacity of 10 tons or more except when used in reasonable
quantities for civilian use;119 and (4) aircraft, helicopters, aircraft
parts, and other parts that could be easily converted to military use. 120
Reexport of other classes of commodities are allowed in conjunc-
tion with a valid reexport license. Permissible commodities include
medicine and medical supplies,12' food and agricultural commodities, 2
items permitted under special general license provisions, 2 3 non-strate-
gic products of United States technology manufactured in foreign
countries," and strategic products of United States technology manu-
factured abroad and exported before March 12, 1982.126
4. Prohibiting Imports of Goods or Services
(a) Direct Imports
Import controls are the second major tool for imposing economic
sanctions against Libya. The Treasury's Customs Services Division reg-
116. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.101(b) (1989) ("No license or authorization contained
in or issued pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from complying with any
other applicable laws or regulations").
117. See 15 C.F.R. § 785.7 (a)(1)(i) and (ii) (1989). Case by case exceptions are
made for goods and technology outside of the United States on March 12, 1982. 15
C.F.R. § 785.7 (a)(2)(i)(A) and (B) (1989). Exceptions are also made for United
States' articles that only comprise 20 percent of a foreign good. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7
(a)(2)(i)(C) (1989).
118. See 15 C.F.R. § 785.7 (a)(1)(iii) (1989). Case by case exceptions are made
for goods and technology outside of the United States before December 20, 1983. 15
C.F.R. § 785.7 (a)(2)(ii)(B) (1989). Exceptions are also made for United States arti-
cles that only comprise 20 percent of a foreign good. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7 (a)(2)(i)(C)
(1989).
119. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(c) (1989).
120. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(d) (1989).
121. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(a) (1989).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(a)(2)(i)(B) (1989).
125. See 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(a)(2)(ii)(A) (1989).
SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA
ulates goods entering the United States. At all borders and points of
entry, customs agents determine whether or not to allow goods to enter
the United States.12 Treasury regulations prohibit goods or services of
Libyan origin27 from entering the United States unless specifically au-
thorized. 128 Publications and materials imported for news service dis-
semination are exempted from the general import ban. 9
(b) Indirect Imports
Imports into the United States from third countries of goods con-
taining Libyan raw materials are determined by a "substantially trans-
formed" standard. The Treasury allows the importation of goods con-
taining Libyan origin materials from third countries when the Libyan
raw materials are "substantially transformed."1 30 Conversely, any
goods originating in Libya transhipped from a third country to the
United States are prohibited from entry, when not "substantially trans-
formed. 1 3 1 The Treasury Department provides no explicit definition of
"substantially transformed," but this term can be interpreted to mean
changing the raw material into a new product.1 32 Transhipment provi-
sions have the effect of allowing "substantially transformed" Libyan
crude oil into the United States. Whether or not the oil meets the "sub-
stantially transformed" test remains a subjective matter which may
pose a risk to would be importers. To avoid "evasion" charges and
other criminal penalties, the importer may wish to refrain from the
transaction. 133
5. Freezing Libyan Assets
Former President Reagan froze all transfers of Libyan assets in
126. See GAO REPORT, supra. note 2, at 13.
127. The term "goods or services of Libyan origin" within the context of Treasury
regulations means: "(a) Goods produced, manufactured, grown, or processed within
Libya; (b) Goods which have entered into Libyan commerce; [and] (c) Services per-
formed in Libya or by a Libyan national who is acting as an agent, employee, or con-
tractor of the Government of Libya, or of a business entity located in Libya .... " 31
C.F.R. § 550.303 (1989).
128. 31 C.F.R. § 550.201 (1989).
129. Id.
130. 31 C.F.R. § 550.408(a) (1989).
131. 31 C.F.R. § 550.408(b) (1989).
132. See' WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 635 (1984) (the dictionary de-
fines the word "transform" as (1) "to change the form or appearance of;" and (2) "to
change the condition, character, or function of."
133. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 827-828.
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order to further increase economic pressure against Libya, and as a
preventive measure against Libya seizing United States assets.' 3 4 The
Libyan assets freeze broadly affects most transfers of Libyan assets,
including restrictions on judicial actions involving Libyan property.
Specifically, the Treasury prohibits all unauthorized transfers of Lib-
yan property, or property interests within the United States or con-
trolled by U.S. persons, or their overseas branches. 3 5 Libyan sanctions
prohibit almost all conceivable means by which one could transfer Lib-
yan funds from- the United States. Treasury's definition of "property"
and "property interests" can be consolidated into four categories: (1)
commercial papers and securities;" 6 (2) tangible property;'37 (3) real
estate and interests therein;' 38 and (4) a variety of other financial prop-
erty interests.' 39 Securities registered in the name of the Government of
Libya are also explicitly prohibited from being acquired, transferred,
imported, exported, or endorsed.' 0
Freezing transfers of U.S. funds to Libya passes constitutional
muster. In Farrakhan v. Reagan,' the district court rejected argu-
ments that the freeze violated a religious group's right to engage in
symbolic free speech by transferring funds to religious brethren in
Libya.' 2 The Free Exercise Clause does not mandate that a religious
organization be allowed to transmit money to foreign governments dur-
ing a national emergency.'" The court reasoned that when the U.S.
subjects a nation to national security controls, no alternative exists that
134. 134. Id. at 832. Freezing Libyan assets gives the Executive branch a bargain-
ing chip for negotiating the resolution of the declared emergency. See Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981) (the United States Supreme Court upheld former
President Carter's Iranian assets freeze as a valid use of power pursuant to IEEPA in
dealing with the declared national emergency).
135. 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1989).
136. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.314 (1989) (such items include money, checks, drafts,
bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, stocks, and bonds)
137. Id. (among other things: goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand,
goods on hand, goods on ships).
138. Id. (real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, leaseholds, ground rents, vendor's
sales agreements, and interests in rents).
139. Id. This category includes "royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judg-
ments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and
their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and
any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or inter-
ests therein, present, future or contingent." Id.
140. 31 C.F.R. § 550.209(b) (1989).
141. 669 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1987).
142. Id. at 512.
143. Id. at 511.
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permits an organization to speak through financial contributions. Such
speech prevents the government from "effectuat[ing] its legitimate and
compelling interest in national security."144 Transfer freezes therefore
pass constitutional scrutiny because the government's compelling inter-
ests outweigh any personal liberties.
Provisions defining the word "transfer" empower economic sanc-
tions, § 550.210 et. seq., to freeze Libyan assets gained via judicial
actions. Among other things, the term "transfer" means "the appoint-
ment of any agent, trustee, or fiduciary; the creation or transfer of any
lien; the issuance, docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judg-
ment, decree, attachment, injunction, execution, or other judicial or ad-
ministrative process . ,,."" No parties have directly challenged the
freeze on Libyan asset transfers pursuant to judicial rulings in court,
but the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
similar freeze imposed on Iranian assets. 46 By requiring licenses for
transfers of Libyan funds, the Treasury essentially requires that all
United States' persons seek Treasury authorization to sue Libya. 4 7
Even if a party prevailed in the action, the party could not collect the
judgment since all assets are frozen.
One cannot help but question the policy underlying this result.
Since the sanctions are designed to financially weaken Libya, then
judgments against that country should be allowed. However, this argu-
ment fails for two major reasons. Allowing private United States citi-
zens to collect judgments against Libya would compel the United
States government to either reopen certain financial and political chan-
nels to transfer the funds, or seize Libyan assets under United States
control to satisfy United States court judgments. Neither alternative
seems attractive. Reopening channels for transferring funds to satisfy
judgments would erode the symbolic effect of isolating Libya.148 Seiz-
ing funds could tempt Libya to likewise seize monies owed to American
companies for their equity interest in Libyan oil fields. Despite its
shortcomings, the policy denying judicial recovery against the Libyan
144. Id.
145. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.313 (1989).
146. See Dames, 453 U.S. at 673 (freezing assets permit the President to main-
tain foreign assets as a "bargaining chip" for negotiating a declared national
emergency).
147. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 834.
148. If America deals with Libya on a limited economic basis, it could send Libya
the messages that the United States government is not completely serious about enforc-
ing the sanctions. Such a signal could jeopardize the "scare factor" underlying eco-
nomic sanctions.
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government remains within the true intent of the emergency sanctions.
Economic leverage can only be applied against Libya if all channels
between the U.S. and Libya are closed.
The Libyan assets freeze also incorporates extraterritorial features
that control overseas subsidiaries of United States financial institu-
tions.149 Overseas subsidiaries are prohibited from relinquishing Libyan
assets, securities, credit, or other financial or real property in which the
Libyan government has an interest. In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust Company15 (hereinafter "Bankers Trust") the United
Kingdom dealt the United States' assets freeze a heavy blow when it
ordered the subsidiary of the New York incorporated bank to release
Libyan funds."' The Bankers Trust holding raises questions as to
whether the extraterritorial provisions can actually be applied to for-
eign subsidiaries if the country in which the subsidiary is located
chooses to ignore the sanctions. In Bankers Trust the holding resulted
as a matter of law.152 To rectify future problems of nations ignoring the
assets freeze, the United States needs other countries to enact similar
laws. 153
6. Regulating U.S. Travel to Libya
Finally, Treasury regulations generally prohibit travel to Libya
from the United States, and from Libya to the United States. Unless
authorized by license, any transaction by a United States person relat-
ing to transportation to or from Libya, 54 any transportation to or from
the United States from Libya by any Libyan person by air or sea,' 55
and airport ticket sales to any person on a plane stopping in Libya are
149. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.209(a) (1989) (assets freeze applies to U.S. persons and
their overseas branches).
150. 26 I.L.M. 1600 (1987) (reproduced from the text provided by the High
Court of Justice (Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court)).
151. In Bankers Trust the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank sued Bankers Trust Com-
panies English branch to seek release of over $131.5 million deposited in a "call" ac-
count. In reaching its decision to order a transfer of funds, the high court reasoned that
"[a]s a general rule the contract between a bank and its customer is governed by the
law of the place where the account is kept, in the absence of agreement to the con-
trary." Id. at 1614. Therefore, Reagan's Libyan assets freeze did not necessarily bind
the United Kingdom.
.152. See id..
153. See infra comment section III.A.l.(a) entitled "Improving economic leverage
through multilateral support".
154. 31 C.F.R. § 550.203(a) (1989).
155. 31 C.F.R. § 550.203(b) (1989).
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illegal. 156 The sanctions further prohibit a U.S. person from engaging
in a transaction relating to travel by any U.S. citizen or permanent
resident alien with the purpose of travelling to Libya or activities
within Libya.6 7 Licenses are not required for: (1) transportation neces-
sary to assist a U.S. citizen or permanent resident in departing from
Libya;' (2) travel taking place prior to February 1, 1986;151 or (3)
travel relating to journalistic activity.1 60
Minister Louis Farrakhan directly challenged the constitutionality
of travel prohibitions, but the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia concluded that he lacked standing to sue."6 The
1986 emergency travel prohibitions cooperatively work with the 1981
ban on United States passports to Libya. Since December of 1981 a
special validation has been required for such passports. The U.S. pass-
port office usually denies such passports.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JANUARY 1986 U.S. ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AS A DETERRENT AGAINST LIBYA'S ENGAGEMENT IN
STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
A. Standards of Success
A "successful" economic sanction ideally induces the target coun-
try into altering its policies to meet the sender's requested policy
changes. 6 ' The 1986 emergency sanctions should generally be consid-
ered effective if the sanctions achieve the first policy goal of discourag-
ing Libya from supporting international terrorism. 163 Continued Libyan
support of terrorist activities does not necessarily imply total failure.
Economic sanctions may still achieve the second policy goal of punish-
156. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.101(c) (1989).
157. 31 C.F.R. § 550.207 (1989).
158. 31 C.F.R. § 550.207(a) (1989).
159. 31 C.F.R. § 550.207(b) (1989).
160. 31 C.F.R. § 550.207(c) (1989).
161. Farrakhan, 669 F.Supp. at 509-510. On February 5, 1986, Minister Far-
rakhan denounced the Libyan sanctions at the Washington D.C. Press Club. He also
stated that he intended to travel to Libya. On February 8, 1986 former United States
Attorney General Edwin Meese, II told a Chicago paper that if Farrakhan travelled to
Libya he would be prosecuted. Farrakhan did travel to Libya on March 12, 1986 and
stayed until March 29, 1986. Farrakhan asserted that he did not use his passport to
leave Libya. Meese never pressed charges. Id. at 508. Farrakhan lacked standing since
he failed to show that he was immediately threatened with arrest for contemplated
First Amendment Activity. Id. at 510.
162. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 6, at 32.
163. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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ing Libya for its policies."" The policy change standard of success can
also be broadened to include achieving ancillary symbolic domestic and
foreign policy goals.' 6 5
1. Economic Leverage Theory
Studies evaluating economic sanctions primarily adopt an eco-
nomic leverage standard for measuring effectiveness.' 6 In other words,
the sender country attempts to apply economic leverage against the tar-
get country, hoping that the increased pressure will cause the target
country to alter its policies. The power to apply economic leverage ulti-
mately lies in the sender country's ability to control the supply of goods
or funds required by the target country.' 6 7 To fully exert leverage, the
target country must be isolated from ideological or commercial allies
who might supply substitute goods or purchase the country's exports.' 68
Isolation ensures that the target state's economic costs of complying
with the sending state's demands are less than noncompliance.' 69
164. See supra text accompanying note 15.
165. See supra text accompanying note 18.
166. See Bialos & Juster supra note 2, at 842.
167. See Economic Sanctions, supra note 16, at 296.
168. See id. Other countries that are willing to help a sanctioned country avoid
sanctions by supplying goods, undercut the sender country's successful implementation
of sanctions. In 1967 South Africa and Portugal continued to supply Rhodesia with
over $160 million worth of goods and fuel despite United Nations sanctions. Id. at 313.
The aid lessened the affect of the sanctions. Therefore, sanctions ideally should be mul-
tilaterally imposed to truly isolate the target country from alternate supply sources.
169. See id. at 296.
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FIGURE 1
UNITED STATES TRADE WITH LIBYA 1985 - 1989.
Date Exports Imports
(Dollars) (%)a (Dollars) (%)b
1985 311,000,000 .15 47,000,000 .01
1986 46,200,000 .01 1,600,000 (c)
1987 101,000 (C) 7,322 (c)
1988 29,660 (c) 46,749 (c)
1989 2,621 (c) 0 d (C)
a Libyan portion of all United States exports for that year.
b Libyan portion of all United States imports for that year.
c Less than .01 percent.
d Commerce reports a zero figure, but this amount may actually
be so small that it simply was not recorded.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce
The United States simply lacks significant economic ties with
Libya to control its economy via direct export controls. For example, as
Figure 1 indicates, statistics show that in 1985 United States exports to
Libya amounted to $311 million. After 1986 emergency sanctions, that
amount dropped to $46.2 million. During the following years, the value
of exports to Libya further declined until in 1989, as Figure 1 indi-
cates, the values only amounted to $2,621. Such a sharp decrease sug-
gests that refusing to sell Libya United States technology, goods, and
machinery, or other resources may result in Libya lacking the person-
nel or supplies to run its oil plants. However, these effects are likely to
only have a short-to-medium term impact on the Libyan economy.17
Other countries readily export technology, goods, and machinery
to Libya. In 1987, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan
exported $4.3 billion worth of such goods to Libya. 7' Libya particu-
larly depends on Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan for
agricultural products since it is self-sufficient in few foods.17 2 The small
amounts of export dollars the U.S. derived from sales to Libya proba-
170. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 844.
171. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 1.
172. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 5.
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bly came from food, clothing and medicine sales to Libya. The Trea-
sury permits direct United States exports of these goods to Libya.1
73
Economic sanctions regulating the export of U.S. goods to third
party countries for possible reexport to Libya effectively supplement
direct export controls. Current regulations focus on a business person's
knowledge for determining whether or not to deny export. The Trea-
sury prohibits exports when the exporter knows the materials will be
used in the Libyan petroleum or petrochemical industry.174 Exports are
also prohibited if the exporter knows the goods are scheduled for ship-
ment to Libya without coming to rest in the third party country or that
the exported technology is to be transformed into products used in the
petroleum industry.175
Without these more specific export controls, a loophole in the ex-
port prohibition scheme would exist. An ingenious exporter could cir-
cumvent direct export controls by shipping goods to a third party coun-
try and later exporting them to Libya. The "businessperson's state of
mind standard" may create some degree of uncertainty when attempt-
ing to prove a subjective state of mind, but objective factors such as
correspondence or testimony could go towards proving intent.
Reexport controls similarly fill a gap in the overall export prohibi-
tion scheme. Even though the government enacted certain aspects of
the reexport controls before the 1986 emergency sanctions, the reexport
controls contribute to the United States' ability to prevent Libya from
circumventing the emergency sanctions. Commerce maintains "long-
arm" control over United States manufactured goods subject to na-
tional security controls even after the goods arrive in third party coun-
tries. 176 By utilizing licensing provisions, Commerce prevents Libya
from gaining access to American goods and technology by purchasing
goods from a third party country willing to reexport the goods to
Libya. The effectiveness of reexport controls therefore lies in their an-
cillary role as enforcers, as opposed to their active role as appliers of
economic leverage.
173. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
176. 15 C.F.R. § 785.7(a) (1989) states that:
a validated license or reexport authorization is required for all U.S.-origin
commodities or technical data, as well as foreign produced products of U.S.
technical data exported from the United States after March 12, 1982 subject
to national security controls for which written assurances against shipments to
Libya are required under § 779.4 of the Export Administration Regulations.
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FIGURE 2
TOTAL IMPORTS OF LIBYAN CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS AND
REFINERY FEEDSTOCKS BY LIBYA'S OIL IMPORTERS EXPRESSED AS
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS.
Country 1985 1986 % of 1987 % of 1988 % of
change change change
France 3059 2426 -20.7 2158 -11.1 3778 75.1
Germany 9460 6717 -29.0 7077 5.4 11157 57.7
Greece 2906 1960 -32.6 2404 22.7 3630 51.0
Italy 13849 14257 +2.9 15477 8.6 17833 15.2
Spain 4315 6823 +58.1 4335 -36.5 4471 3.4
U.K. 1976 1860 -5.8 1491 -19.8 1967 13.8'
U.S. - - - - -
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation Development, Interna-
tional Energy Agency
This chart shows how much crude oil, natural gas liquids, and re-
finery feedstocks were imported by Libya's major importers from 1985
to 1988. The United States no longer imports Libyan oil products.
However, this chart includes the United States figures for sake of con-
trast. The following definitions are relevant for interpreting the chart:
CRUDE OIL - Mineral oil consisting of a mixture of hydrocarbons
of natural origin, yellow to black in color, of variable specific gravity
viscosity. It includes lease condensate (separate liquids) which is recov-
ered from gaseous hydrocarbons in lease separation facilities.
NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS (NGLs) - Liquid or liquefied hydrocar-
bons produced in the manufacture, purification and stabilization of nat-
ural gas. Their. characteristics vary, ranging from those of butane pro-
pane to heavy oils. NGLs are either distilled with crude oil in
refineries, blended with refined petroleum products or used directly de-
pending on their characteristics.
REFINERY FEEDSTOCKS - A refinery feedstock is a product or a
combination of products derived from crude oil destined for further
processing in the refining industry other than blending.
United States import controls are similarly. ineffective under a
traditional economic leverage model. In theory, Libya should be very
vulnerable to economic sanctions which deprive the country of its oil
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export revenues.' 77 The U.S. simply does not directly or indirectly im-
port Libyan products in significant enough quantities for a decrease in
importation to adversely effect the Libyan economy. Prior to the 1982
oil embargo,178 United States imports of Libyan Pil reached a high of
$8.6 billion worth during '1980.'1 9 In 1983 the amount of Libyan crude
oil imported into the United States dropped to $900,000 worth. 8 '
When former President Reagan implemented the 1986 emergency
sanctions the U.S. only imported $1.6 million worth of Libyan crude
oil.181
Moreover, Libya directly offsets any lost U.S. oil sales by selling to
countries ready and willing to purchase its oil products. Libya primar-
ily sells its oil'to Italy, the Eastern bloc, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Spain, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. As Figure 2
indicates, during 1986 Italy imported over 14 billion metric tons of
Libyan crude oil, NGLs, and refinery feedstocks. The next year, 1987,
Italy imported nearly 15.5 billion metric tons for a net increase of
8.6% 182 Italy drastically increased its Libyan oil products imports dur-
ing 1988 when the country imported 17.8 billion metric tons. This fig-
ure represents a 15.2% change over the 1987 figures. Unless the
United States can persuade Libya's major oil importers to cut back on
their own oil purchases, U.S. import controls shall continue to have a
limited impact on Libya's economy. 83
The Libyan assets freeze likewise fails as an instrument to coerce
Libya into altering its policy of supporting international terrorism.
When the emergency sanctions froze Libyan assets, Libya held less
than $1 billion worth of assets in the United States. 4 As is the case
with U.S. export and import trade with Libya, the U.S. does not con-
trol a significant amount of Libyan assets to wield a large enough eco-
nomic club against Libya. Instead, the United States mainly froze Lib-
yan assets as a defensive measure to compensate U.S. oil firms in case
Libya seized their assets. 8 '
177. Libya depends on oil for 99 percent of its export revenues. GAO REPORT,
supra note 2, at 2.
178. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
179. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 5.
180. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
181. Id.
182. During 1987 Libya earned $6.5 billion from oil sales to Italy, Eastern bloc
Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 8, at 1.
183. See Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 845.
184. Id. at 845, n.151.
185. Id. at n.152.
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Prohibitions against U.S. performance of United States-Libyan
contracts are devised as an additional tool for applying economic lever-
age. In theory, removing skilled workers from Libya's oil industry
should have caused oil production to cease. However, in practice, the
ban yielded short-to-medium term success. In the short term, Libya
may have lacked workers for their oil plants, but as Figure 2 demon-
strates, Libya has obviously replaced these American workers. Libyan
oil plants are continuously producing oil for export. In 1988, Libya ex-
ported 40,869,000 million metric tons of oil products to its major trade
partners. This amount represents a 27% increase over the 32,183,000
million metric tons exported in 1986. Indeed, Libya could easily re-
place American workers with Italian workers. During 1984, 12,000 to
15,000 Italians lived and worked in Libya.""
(a) Improving economic leverage through multilateral support
Increased long-term effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions
against Libya invariably requires other nations to enact similar sanc-
tions. Other nations have indeed expressed a willingness to address Lib-
yan terrorism. On January 27, 1986 the European Community
(E.C.) 8 7 intensified its efforts to fight international terrorism. Foreign
Ministers of the twelve E.C. member states issued a statement in which
they decided to: (1) establish a permanent working body to promote
and monitor common action to discourage terrorism; (2) ban the export
of military equipment to countries supporting terrorism; and (3) pre-
vent their citizens and industries from taking commercial advantage of
antiterrorism sanctions.'
186. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 817, n.64. Large numbers of Italians resid-
ing in Libya are a result from the 1930s and 1940s preceding World War II. At this
time Libya came under Italian colonial rule. Mussolini intended to make Libya a
"fourth shore" of Italy in which thousands of Italians could live and grow crops. When
World War II ended the Allies liberated all of Italy's former colonies. Despite the
failure of the fourth shore, Italy currently has a valuable trade partner in Libya. C.
SEGRE, THE FOURTH SHORE: THE ITALIAN COLONIZATION OF LIBYA 182-186 (1975).
187. The European Community comprises Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.
188. European Community News, January 28, 1986, reprinted in Evolution of
Sanctions, supra note 2, at 207-208. The statement does not specifically mention Libya.
However, the reference to the attacks at Rome and Vienna airports by the Abu Nidal
Group, known to be sponsored by Libya leaves no doubt that the E.C. were referring to
Libya. See supra notes 3-5, and accompanying text (documenting the bombings and
Libya's support for the Abu Nidal Group).
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Likewise, in 1986 the United States, Canada,189 the Federal Re-
public of Germany (West Germany), Britain, Italy, France, and Japan
appeared ready to take a unified stand against Qadhafi and his terrorist
activities. The seven industrialized countries made Libyan sponsored
terrorism a key topic of their 12th annual economic summit held in
Tokyo, Japan. 9 ' The nations combined to produce a declaration on in-
ternational terrorism. 9 ' The sole trade restriction included in the dec-
189. On January 10, 1986, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney issued a
press statement on international terrorism stating the governments measures to combat
terrorism. Reprinted in Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 2, at 202. The government
immediately ceased all financial assistance to Canadian firms pursuing business in
Libya, and insurance coverage provided by the Export Development Corporation on
new Canadian business activities in Libya. Id. at 203. The controls supplemented ex-
isting prohibitions against export military equipment to Libya. Id.
Canadian-imposed unilateral economic sanctions against Libya probably would
have an effectiveness similar to the U.S.-imposed sanctions. Canada also lacks signifi-
cant economic ties with Libya to exert economic leverage against that country. In 1988
Canada only exported $4 million worth of goods to Libya, and imported $49 million
worth of goods. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS,
1989 Y.B. 257 [hereinafter IMF STATISTICS].
190. See The New York Times, April 29, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
191. The Tokyo summit declaration on international terrorism states in pertinent
part:
1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and
representatives of the European Community, assembled here in Tokyo,
strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international terrorism in all of its
forms, of its accomplices and of those, including governments, who sponsor
it. . .
2. [W]e pledge ourselves to make maximum effort to fight against
[terrorism]. ...
3. Terrorism must be fought effectively through determined, tenacious, dis-
creet and patient action combining nationals measures with international co-
operation. . . . Therefore, we urge all like-minded nations to collaborate with
us . .. .
4. We specify the following as measure open to any government concerned to
deny to international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out
their aims, and to identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism.
We have decided to apply these measures within the framework of inter-
national law and in our own jurisdictions[,] . . . and in particular of Libya,
until such time as the state concerned abandons its complicity in, or support
for, such terrorism. The measures are:
- refusal to export arms to states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- -strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular missions. ..
which engage in such activities...;
- denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel . . . con-
victed of such a terrorist offense;
- improved extradition procedures . . . in respect of nationals of states
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laration implemented a policy of refusing to export arms to states spon-
soring or supporting terrorism. 92 .The Soviet Union, one of Libya's
largest arms suppliers, later adopted the suggested ban on exporting
arms to Libya."' However, Libya turned to alternative suppliers such
as Greece, Brazil, and Yugoslavia for arms.194
The dozens of nations participating in the E.C. meeting, and the
industrialized nations summit had a prime opportunity to enact wide-
spread multilateral economic sanctions against Libya. Instead, the na-
tions only agreed to a lone ban on military exports to Libya. Long-term
economic leverage can only be properly applied against Libya if major
markets and suppliers are eliminated.' Simply banning sales of mili-
tary equipment to Libya does not solve the problem of cutting off
Libya's ability to finance terrorist activities. Oil sales income provides
the life blood for Libya's economy. 9 ' Proceeds from oil sales enable
Libya to purchase machinery and transport equipment.'97 The United
which sponsor or support terrorism;
- stricter immigration and visa requirements in respect of nationals of
states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- the closest possible bilateral and multilateral cooperation between po-
lice and security organizations and other relevant authorities in the fight
against terrorism.
5. We will maintain close cooperation in furthering the objectives of this
statement and in considering further the measures ....
Reuters Wire Service, May 5, 1986 (emphasis added).
192. Id.
193. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LIBYA: A COUNTRY
STUDY xx (1989) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY].
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
196. Oil products constitute Libya's chief export product. In 1988, export sales to
Libya's major market countries listed in Figure 2 amounted to nearly $5 billion. IMF
STATISTICS, supra note 189, at 257.
197. See BACKGROUND NOTES, Supra note 8, at 1 (listing machinery and trans-
port equipment as major imports).
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States must convince Libya's major trade partners1 98-France, 99 Ger-
many,200 Italy, 201 Spain,20 2 the United Kingdom, 20 3 and Japan 2 4 -to
purchase oil elsewhere and sell their goods to another market. To-
gether, these countries represent the majority of Libya's trade
198. FIGURE 3
MAJOR LIBYAN TRADE PARTNERS 1985 - 1988
(IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988
Exports
France 706 321 435 492
Germany 1,930 882 1,056 1,381
Italy 3,268 1,765 2,170 2,316
Japan 7 7 0 5
Spain 1,004 864 740 600
U.K. 360 183 199 L 182
Imports
France 268 248 266 318
Germany 568 564 562 697
Italy 1,380 1,039 1,226 1,382
Japan 281 216 330 663
Spain 190 137 141 138
U.K. 339 418 397 462
Source: IMF STATISTICS, supra note 189 at 257-258.
199. As figure 2 indicates, France imported 3.8 million metric tons of oil products
in 1988 from Libya. In 1988 France exported $318 million worth of goods to Libya.
See supra note 198.
200. As figure 2 indicates, Germany imported 11.2 million metric tons of oil prod-
ucts in 1988 from Libya. In 1988, Germany exported $697 million worth of goods to
Libya. See supra note 198.
201. As figure 2 indicates, Italy imported 17.8 million metric tons of oil products
in 1988 from Libya. In 1988 Italy exported $1.4 billion worth of goods to Libya. See
supra note 198.
202. As figure 2 indicates, Spain imported 4.5 million metric tons of oil products
in 1988 from Libya. In 1988, Spain exported $138 million worth of goods to Libya. See
supra note 198.
203. As figure 2 indicates, the United Kingdom imported 1.7 million metric tons
of oil products in 1988 from Libya. In 1988, the United Kingdom exported $462 mil-
lion worth of goods to Libya. See supra note 198.
204. Japan exported $663 million worth of goods to Libya in 1988. See supra note
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income.2"'
Western European and other nations, hesitate to criticize Libyan
policies too loudly. Commentators suggest this hesitation stems from a
dependence on Libyan trade, and Western Europe's close physical
proximity to Libya.2"' The assertion that certain nations hesitate to
criticize Libya's support of international terrorism for fear of jeopardiz-
ing their oil supply ignores a rudimentary fact. Oil could be purchased
from other members of Oil Exporting Countries (OEC).2 °7 The U.S.
government chose such an alternative in 1982 after passing the oil em-
bargo against Libya.2"8
Immediately following the embargo, the dollar value of Libyan oil
imported into the U.S. dropped from $8.6 billion to $900,000.2°9 In
1988, as indicated by figure 2, the U.S. continued to import only a
minuscule amount of Libyan oil products. The bulk of purchased oil
came from other OEC countries.21 0 If other OEC members are willing
to sell oil to the United States during its Libyan oil embargo, certain
members may also be willing to sell to other countries boycotting Lib-
yan oil. It seems unlikely that other Arab oil producing countries would
hesitate to supply former Libyan oil to markets solely because of Arab
unity. Saudi Arabia's relationship with Libya remains strained at
205. In 1988, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Japan
comprised $49.8 billion or 64.9% of Libya's total export income. See IMF STATISTICS,
supra note 189, at 257-258. Likewise, in 1988, Libya purchased $36.3 billion worth of
goods from these countries. See id. These purchases amounted to 47.5% of Libya's
total import purchases. See id.
206. Bialos & Juster, supra note 2, at 818. The authors imply that if Libya's
major trade partners criticize Qadhafi's terrorist policies too loudly, Libya could retali-
ate against the countries by decreasing their oil sales, or applying terrorist reprisals.
207. The IMF considers the OEC group to include Algeria, Indonesia, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
208. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 178-180.
1990]
230 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
best.21
The rationalization that Western Europe hesitates to criticize
Qadhafi too loudly due to its close proximity to Libya possesses some
merit. The United Kingdom and other Western European countries pe-
riodically experience terrorist acts. The 1986 bombings of the Rome
and Vienna airports support this proposition. Nevertheless, Western
European nations must courageously take stern economic action
against Libya to discourage Libyan support for international terrorism.
2. Symbolic Success
Despite the long-term inability of the 1986 emergency sanctions to
apply economic leverage against Libya, other positive domestic and for-
eign policy results did materialize. The 1986 emergency economic sanc-
tions have succeeded in achieving the long-term policy goal of symboli-
cally demonstrating the United States' intolerance toward Libyan
state-sponsored terrorism. United States Presidents most frequently ap-
ply export controls as tools to symbolically "demonstrate opposition" or
"distance" the United States from repressive governments or similarly
express disapproval of "extreme acts". 12 Libyan sanctions reflect both
the Reagan and Bush administrations' disapproval of "extreme acts" of
Libyan terrorist activities.
210. FIGURE 4
Major U.S. Import Quantities of Crude Oil, NGL, And Refinery
Feedstocks from OEC Countries for 1988 Expressed as Thousands
of Metric Tons.
Country Amount
Indonesia 9241
Iraq 17530
Saudi Arabia 52030
Nigeria 30177
Venezuela 28464
SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, QUARTERLY OIL STATISTICS AND ENERGY
BALANCES: 2ND QUARTER 1989 328 (1989).
211. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 193, at xxvii.
212. Abbott, supra note 24, at 823. The United States' imposition of economic
sanctions against South Africa to demonstrate opposition toward that country's racially
oppressive system of Apartheid most vividly illustrates this premise. See supra note 21,
and accompanying text.
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a. Taking a Stand Against State-Sponsored Terrorism
Enacting economic sanctions fulfills the domestic policy goal of re-
assuring Americans that their government is combatting terrorism.
While at first glance this may seem of minimal importance, the under-
lying purpose has serious political implications. The public bases the
President's effectiveness on his ability to respond to international crises
and threats. To achieve success in the public eye, the President must
carefully tailor his responses to international incidents.213 Public ap-
proval of how the President responds to international crises and threats
translates into votes during reelection, and popularity for his political
party.
The 1986 emergency sanctions have likewise shown long-term Suc-
cess in achieving the foreign policy goal of increasing international ac-
tion against Libya and other nations sponsoring terrorist activities.
Members of the E.C. and nations participating in the industrialized na-
tions' summit took various non-military measures against Libya follow-
ing the U.S. sanctions. Although the responses did not involve substan-
tial economic sanctions, the measures nevertheless embraced the
American idea that Libyan terrorism requires a response of disapproval
by all nations.
At best, the travel ban achieves the third policy goal of symboli-
cally demonstrating opposition against Libyan policies. Preventing U.S.
citizens from travelling to Libya does not squarely fit into the sanctions
arsenal as a tool for applying economic leverage. The ban mainly seeks
to protect American citizens from Libyan reprisals. Theoretically, such
a restriction succeeds over the long-term by informing western nations
that travelling to, or residing in Libya poses a high safety risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1986 emergency economic sanctions are an outgrowth of the
Reagan administration's intolerance for Libya's policy of supporting in-
ternational acts of terrorism. Nonemergency export and import controls
failed to coerce Libya into changing its policies, so former President
Reagan enacted widespread controls restricting exports, imports, finan-
213. When word reached America that an American died in the 1986 airport
bombings, public disdain for Qadhafi drastically increased. This public disdain trans-
ferred into political pressure for former President Reagan to "respond". After the
bombing of Qadhafi's compound, few Americans expressed sympathy when preliminary
reports indicated that Qadhafi died. See generally ABC Video, supra note 105. An
argument can therefore be made for a general public approval of the bombing.
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cial transfers, and contract performance between Libya and all U.S.
persons. Unfortunately, in 1986 the United States engaged in little
trade with Libya. Since the 1982 oil embargo on Libyan oil, the United
States has purchased very few products from Libya. Nor has the
United States sold a significant amount of machinery to Libya. From
the beginning, these two factors doomed the goal of applying economic
leverage against Libya to coerce the country into changing its policies.
The sanctions only adversely affected Libya for a short period of time.
As time progressed, Libya relied on is major trade partners such as
Italy to buy its oil and provide the much needed machinery.
Despite only short-term success in applying economic leverage that
adversely affected the Libyan economy, the sanctions realize long-term
symbolic success. The sanctions convey to the American people and
foreign nations a message that the U.S. will no longer stand idly by as
Qadhafi commits acts of international terrorism. Moreover, other coun-
tries have followed the U.S. lead and enacted retaliatory measures
against Libya.
Colonel Qadhafi remains a nemesis to the United States and other
western countries. Intelligence reports indicate that Libya possesses the
ability to produce mustard gas for use in germ warfare. President Bush
realized the continued Libyan threat and chose to renew emergency
economic sanctions against Libya. Other nations must staunchly sup-
port the "spirit" of the sanctions by enacting their own stringent eco-
nomic controls against Libya. Alternative purchasers and suppliers al-
low Libya to earn the money it uses to finance international terrorism
from other sources. Unless Libya's major trade partners join the battle,
economic sanctions against Libya shall be confined to intangible sym-
bolic success.
John Frederick Cooke
